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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 A jury found Mr. Bagshaw guilty of possessing methamphetamine.  Two errors infected 
his trial and require remand.  First, the district court abused its discretion by admitting the audio 
of the traffic stop at issue, in which Mr. Bagshaw lied about his name and birthday, because it 
was not relevant to the possession charge and was unduly prejudicial.  Second, the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by telling the jury that Mr. Bagshaw knew where to walk to get out of the 
view of the dash camera because that claim was factually baseless and improperly implied that 
Mr. Bagshaw is a seasoned criminal.  The Court should vacate Mr. Bagshaw’s conviction, 
reverse the order granting the State’s motion for reconsideration, and remand to the district court 
for a new trial.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In October 2014, Bingham County Sheriff’s Deputy Humpherys stopped a van for 
speeding.  (See State’s Ex. 4 to 1/21/15 trial, VTS_01_1,1 at 0:25–1:55.)  Mr. Bagshaw was in 
the passenger seat of the van, and his boss was driving.  (Id.)  Just seconds after walking up to 
the van, Deputy Humpherys asked Mr. Bagshaw for his identification.   (Id. at 1:45–2:00.)  
Mr. Bagshaw said he did not have it but that his name was James Pope and he was born on 
.  (Id. at 1:55–3:30.)  He said he didn’t have a middle name and he didn’t know 
what his social security number was.  (Id.)  When that name did not check out, Deputy 
Humpherys asked for backup.   (Id. at 4:20–5:30.)  Mr. Bagshaw next said his name was James 
Hope, but the birth date he gave still did not match up.  (Id. at 5:30 –6:50.)  Then Mr. Bagshaw 
                                            
1 State’s Exhibit 4 is a dash camera video taken from Deputy Humpherys’ car.  It is divided into 
three files, which are labeled “VTS_01_0,” “VTS_01_1,” and “VTS_01_2.” 
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gave Deputy Humpherys a different birth year—1987—at which point Deputy Humpherys asked 
Mr. Bagshaw to step out of the van.  (Id. at 6:50–7:05.)   
Mr. Bagshaw got out, walked to the front of the van, and then Deputy Humpherys 
instructed him to walk to the back of the van.  (Id. at 7:00–7:30.)  When pressed about the 
information not panning out, Mr. Bagshaw admitted to giving “partial information” and lying.  
(Id. at 7:30–8:30.)  When asked how old he was, Mr. Bagshaw said “twenty-seven” then a 
second later, “twenty-six.”  (Id. at 9:00–9:15.)  After Deputy Humpherys pointed out that 
Mr. Bagshaw was in so deep that he could not even keep his lies straight, he offered to give 
Mr. Bagshaw a fresh start.  (Id. at 9:10–9:30.)  Mr. Bagshaw then said he was twenty-eight and 
gave yet another birth date.   (Id. at 9:10–10:15.)  When dispatch reported that that birth date still 
did not match the name James Hope, the officers asked for any other information to help prove 
his identity.  (Id. at 10:15–12:.)  He gave the officers other information, including addresses and 
relatives’ names.   (Id. at 12:00–14:00.)   
Eventually, Mr. Bagshaw admitted that his name was actually Nathan Bagshaw and that 
he might have a warrant out for his arrest.  (Id. at 14:00–14:45.)  Deputy Humpherys confirmed 
the warrant, arrested him, and allowed Mr. Bagshaw’s boss to leave.  (Id. at 15:15–17:00.)  After 
the van drove away, one of the deputies noticed a pack of cigarettes which appeared to be located 
toward the front of where the van had been parked.  (State’s Ex. 4, VTS_01_2.)  They found 
methamphetamine inside the cigarette pack.  (Id.)   
The State charged Mr. Bagshaw with possessing methamphetamine.  (R., p.34.)  Before 
trial, Mr. Bagshaw filed a motion in limine to exclude the audio portion of the video taken by the 
dash camera in Deputy Humphrey’s car, as well any testimony about Mr. Bagshaw giving false 
 3 
information to the deputies.2  (R., pp.98–102; Tr., p.9, Ls.13–17.)  Mr. Bagshaw sought to 
eliminate the audio because it was irrelevant to the possession of methamphetamine charge under 
I.R.E. 401 and 402, and unduly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403.  (R., pp.98–102; Tr., p.1, L.9 – p.2, 
L.15.)  The State countered: 
[I]t all goes to the nature of the stop, where he’s trying to hide something.  And all 
that comes to a head when the van drives away—as the defendant is kept in 
custody of the officers, the van drives away, and there’s a carton of cigarettes at 
the front of the van where the methamphetamine was found.  
And so it all derives into the same incident where he’s trying to hide 
something.  And I think it—that’s where it becomes very relevant in this 
argument.  Because without the other testimony or without knowing that he’s 
trying to hide something, which he’s doing verbally and physically, then we pass 
the 401 test and we move to the 403 test and probative value.  
And I believe that we get past that step because we haven’t been shown 
that this substantially prejudices the defendant.   
 
(Tr., p.4, Ls.5–20.)  After reviewing the video, the district court granted Mr. Bagshaw’s motion 
(R., pp.108–110), and the case went to trial.   
After the jury was sworn, the State asked the court to reconsider its ruling.  (Tr., p.86, 
L.21 – p.88, L.4.)  The State provided the court with a couple of cases regarding the 
“consciousness of guilt” exception, and explained:   
Here we have not only one incident of fabrication, we have multiple 
incidents of fabrication, most of which involve a false identification purpose.  
With that theory, this evidence under the—the evidence of the audio that’s 
attached to the video should come in because of the consciousness of guilt theory.  
Where we’re able to play that even on other crimes—as Idaho law has 
stated, even on other crimes or other circumstances, we can still put on that 
evidence in this case to prove consciousness of guilt.  
And I know the Court—I didn’t see this in the decision, but this is my 
inferences from the Court’s ruling, is that all of the false identification purposes 
were attached to the arrest warrant.  But my argument is that the defendant at that 
time while he was sitting in the passenger van . . . he had a carton of 
cigarettes. . . .  He gets out, he knows he’s guilty at that point, and so he’s trying 
to cover that up.  
                                            
2 Mr. Bagshaw did not challenge the admission of the video itself, just the audio accompanying 
the video.   
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And I don’t believe that’s only attached to the arrest warrant.  As the 
Court has watched the video, he’s given multiple chances to talk to the officer 
about the arrest warrant only.  He keeps hiding the ball, and finally he says, “Fine.  
I have a felony arrest warrant.”  
But the other problem is he knows he’s in trouble because he’s possessing 
meth and that constitutes a probation or parole violation that he’s on.  And he’s 
trying to cover this or mask it all under a false identification because of the 
consciousness of guilt.   
This is why I think all of this evidence is relevant, and I’d ask the Court to 
overturn its decision and allow us to play a portion of the audio.   
 
(Tr., p.91, L.2 – p.92, L.11 (emphasis added).) 
 
 In response, Mr. Bagshaw argued:  
  
I have some problems with that one, because it hasn’t been established that he’s 
guilty of anything other than lying to the police officer.  
 I guess there’s more than just the crime at hand or the crime that he’s 
charged with that’s come into play here.  He also knew that he had a warrant out 
for his arrest and obviously didn’t want to get picked up on that.  And I believe he 
indicated that to the police officer in the videotape.  And, in my mind, that’s all 
that his statements to the police officer goes to show, is that he didn’t want to get 
picked up.   
I go back to the basic relevance argument.  I mean, the evidence is 
relevant if it tends to show that a fact of consequence is more or less likely or 
more or less probable in the case.  And here I still don’t see any nexus between 
him giving a police officer a false name and false birth date and him actually 
possessing methamphetamine.  
I would assume that under the consciousness of guilt argument you would 
have to have some kind of nexus going between him thinking he’s guilty and of the 
crime committed.  Well, there’s absolutely no nexus here between him giving a 
false name to whether or not he possessed methamphetamine.   
And that’s also shown by the facts that come out.  Because the police 
officer—it wasn’t like, as the State has argued, that he was trying to avoid a 
patdown or trying to avoid detection of methamphetamine on him.  Because the 
police officer did search him, and he didn’t find any methamphetamine.  The 
methamphetamine was found in the area of the vehicle away from my client.   
 
(Tr., p.93, L.4 – p.94, L.9 (emphasis added).)  
The court granted the motion for reconsideration:  
And I’ll tell you both right up-front I wrote my original decision saying 
that the audio comes in as circumstantial evidence, but then I took it out because I 
didn’t have case law to support that.  What the State is now telling me is that the 
case laws they’ve given me supports that connection and it should come in.    
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I think this is a discretionary matter for the Court.  And given these cases, 
I’m going to allow the audio in.  I’m going to allow it in only as to the false 
identification, not as to the credit card.  And I’m going to allow it in based upon 
the case law that was cited in the argument.   
 
(Tr., p.98, Ls.3–14.)  Later on in the trial, the court added that it had come across a recent 
decision, State v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286 (Ct. App. 2015), which supported its decision. 
(Tr., p.117, L.19 – p.118, L.24.) 
The State’s evidence at trial consisted of photos of the methamphetamine and the 
controlled substance analysis report (State’s Exs. 1–3), the dash camera video and corresponding 
audio (State’s Ex. 4), and the testimony of Deputy Humpherys and Mr. Bagshaw’s boss 
(Tr., p.149, L.23 – p.153, L.23).  The State’s theory of the case was that Mr. Bagshaw had the 
cigarette box and methamphetamine on him when he and his boss were pulled over, and that 
Mr. Bagshaw ditched the methamphetamine at the front of the van when he first got out of the 
van.  (See generally, Tr.) 
At the close of the State’s case, Mr. Bagshaw testified in his own defense.  He said he did 
not have any methamphetamine that night, he lied about his identity because he knew he had a 
warrant out for his arrest, and he did not lie because he was trying to “cover up any 
methamphetamine.”  (Tr., p.158, L.16 – p.159, L.12.)  When asked why he went to the front of 
the van when Deputy Humpherys asked him to step out of the vehicle, Mr. Baghsaw said “I’ve 
been in traffic stops where they’ve asked for me to step to the front and some where they ask to 
step to the rear.  He didn’t state.  I just went to the nearest point of the vehicle.”  (Tr., p.159, 
Ls.13–20.)   
In closing argument, the prosecutor said:  
What we do know is that Nathan Bagshaw got out of the van and walked 
to the front of the van and paused.  He walked to the front of the van out of the 
light and out of the camera view.   
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What we do know is that he has been pulled over several times, in his 
testimony, and he knows better where to walk to get out of the view of the camera.  
We know what he paused for.  We know that his last-ditch effort on 
getting rid of the methamphetamine was his only hope on not getting caught. . . .  
. . . .  
You’ve heard the defendant’s testimony.  And what can we believe in his 
testimony?  Because what we know is under stressful situations he’s not afraid to 
lie to the law over and over and over again.  And he wants you to believe him 
today. . . .   
 
(Tr., p.170, L.24 – p.172, L.22 (emphasis added).)   
 The jury found Mr. Bagshaw guilty of possessing methamphetamine (Tr., p.185, Ls.11–
19), and the court sentenced him to serve seven years, with three years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction.  (R., pp.166–68; Tr., p.196, Ls.21–24.)  Mr. Bagshaw timely appealed.  (R., pp.170–




I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the audio of the traffic stop, in 
which Mr. Bagshaw lied about his name and birthday, because it was not relevant to the 
possession charge and was unduly prejudicial?  
 
II. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by telling the jury that Mr. Bagshaw knew where 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Into Evidence The Audio Of The Traffic 
Stop, In Which Mr. Bagshaw Lied About His Name And Birthday, Because It Was Not Relevant 
To The Possession Charge And Was Unduly Prejudicial 
 
This Court reviews the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014).  “A trial court does not 
abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the 
boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the 
decision through an exercise of reason.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Whether 
evidence is relevant is a matter of law which this Court reviews de novo, but whether evidence is 
more probative than prejudicial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Abdullah, 
158 Idaho 386, 439 (2015). 
 The district court erred by admitting into evidence the audio of the traffic stop.  First, 
Mr. Bagshaw gave the deputies false information in an attempt to avoid arrest on the outstanding 
warrant.  Absent the arrest warrant, he would not have had any reason to give the deputies false 
information, and so the false information did not show consciousness of guilt as to the possession 
charge.  Second, even if relevant, the audio is so prejudicial that it must be excluded. 
   
A. Mr. Bagshaw’s Attempt To Hide His Identity Does Not Show Consciousness Of Guilt 
Regarding The Methamphetamine, And Is Therefore Irrelevant And Inadmissible 
 
“‘Relevant Evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence.”  I.R.E. 401.  Relevant evidence is generally admissible.  
I.R.E. 402.  “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
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a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .”  I.R.E. 404.   
“I.R.E. 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing . . . 
consciousness of guilt.”  State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 917 (2015) (quoting State v. Sheahan, 
139 Idaho 267, 279 (2003)) (alterations in original); see, e.g.,. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 279 
(holding that the defendant’s attempt to destroy evidence implicated consciousness of guilt); 
Cook v. State, 157 Idaho 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that “threats against a witness’s 
family and the victim was relevant to show consciousness of guilt.”).  “When evidence that is 
offered to establish consciousness of guilt also supports non-inculpatory inferences, this goes to 
the weight, not the relevance of the evidence.”  Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 917 (citing Sheahan, 
139 Idaho at 279).  For example, the Ehrlick Court found that that Ehrlick’s attempts to contact a 
witness and Ehrlick’s attempted suicide were admissible as consciousness of guilt evidence, even 
though both actions could have also been attributed to non-inculpatory motivations.  Ehrlick, 
158 Idaho at 917, 920.  Similarly, in State v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286, 292 (Ct. App. 2015), the 
Court of Appeals held that evidence of Passons fleeing from police was admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt as to all of his crimes, even though Passons claimed his actions showed 
consciousness of guilt as to one crime but not the others.   
The district court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Bagshaw lying to the police.  As 
explained by defense counsel at trial, the evidence admitted must be connected to the crime 
charged in order for it to show consciousness of guilt:   
[T]he evidence is relevant if it tends to show that a fact of consequence is more or 
less likely or more or less probable in the case.  And here I still don’t see any 
nexus between him giving a police officer a false name and false birth date and 
him actually possessing methamphetamine.  
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I would assume that under the consciousness of guilt argument you would 
have to have some kind of nexus going between him thinking he’s guilty and of 
the crime committed.  Well, there’s absolutely no nexus here between him giving 
a false name to whether or not he possessed methamphetamine.   
 
(Tr., p.93, L.16 – p.94, L.2.)  Mr. Bagshaw’s attempt to conceal his identity did not and could not 
have had anything to do with his possessing methamphetamine.   His statements did not make it 
any less likely that the officers would find the cigarette pack, nor did they make it less likely that 
the officers would connect the cigarette pack to Mr. Bagshaw.  In other words, his attempt to 
hide his identity did not show that he possessed methamphetamine or that he believed the 
substance to be methamphetamine.  (See R., p.127 (possession of a controlled substance jury 
instruction).)   
Instead, Mr. Bagshaw’s attempt to hide his identity had everything to do with the warrant 
out for his arrest.  Absent the arrest warrant, he would have simply given Deputy Humpherys his 
name and went on his way.  Therefore, the arrest warrant and the methamphetamine were not 
two separate motivations Mr. Bagshaw may have had when he lied about his identity—the only 
possible motivation was the arrest warrant.  The district court erred in concluding that “there’s 
more than one reason behind his flight in this case” (Tr., p.118, Ls.14–15), and that 
Mr. Bagshaw’s fabricated identities showed consciousness of guilt regarding the 
methamphetamine. 
       
B. Even If Mr. Bagshaw’s Attempt To Hide His Identity Were Relevant To Show 
Consciousness Of Guilt, That Evidence Is So Prejudicial That It Suggests A Decision On 
An Improper Basis, And Thus Must Be Excluded Under I.R.E. 403 
 
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”  I.R.E. 403.  “Evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant’s case.  Evidence is unfairly prejudicial 
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when it suggests decision on an improper basis.”  State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 465 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654 (Ct. App. 1994)).   
Here, the audio showed Mr. Bagshaw giving the officer various false names, birthdays, 
ages, and other information, over the course of more than twelve minutes.3  (State’s Ex. 4, at 
1:50–14:20.)  Mr. Baghaw was clearly evasive and attempting to hide his identity.  
(See generally, State’s Ex. 4.)  In other words, the evidence showed that Mr. Bagshaw has no 
respect for the law and that he would lie over and over again to try to avoid taking responsibility 
for his actions.  This sends a clear message to the jury—Mr. Bagshaw is a liar and a bad 
person—which suggests an improper basis on which to convict.  See Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 465.  
Therefore, even if relevant, the evidence is so prejudicial that it must be excluded.4 
   
II. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Telling The Jury That Mr. Bagshaw Knew Where To 
Walk To Get Out Of The View Of The Dash Camera 
 
If prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, this Court may only reverse if the 
defendant shows that the violation was fundamental error.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
(2010).  This requires the defendant to show “the alleged error:  (1) violates one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  Id. at 228.  “Where a prosecutor 
                                            
3 Because the video speaks for itself, Mr. Bagshaw respectfully asks that the Court review the 
video.   
4 For these same reasons, the State cannot show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 466 (“Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial.  To hold 
an error harmless, this Court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no 
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”). 
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attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions 
and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”  Id. at 227 
(emphasis added). 
Here, the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct and violated Mr. Bagshaw’s 
due process rights when he claimed that Mr. Bagshaw “knows better where to walk to get out of 
the view of the camera.”  (Tr., p.171, Ls.4–5.)  That statement was improper for two reasons.  
First, it was factually unsupported.  Mr. Bagshaw never said anything about cameras, the 
location of cameras, or how to avoid being recorded.  (Tr., p.158, L.8 – p.160, L.15.)  Second, 
the prosecutor’s claim improperly implied that Mr. Bagshaw’s earlier traffic stops led to criminal 
charges serious enough that he viewed dash camera videos, and thus knew exactly where the 
cameras are located and what they film.  By relying on facts not in evidence to imply that 
Mr. Bagshaw is a seasoned criminal, the prosecutor violated Mr. Bagshaw’s due process rights.   
Second, the error is clear from the record (see Tr., p.158, L.8 – p.160, L.15, p.170, L.24 – 
p.172, L.22), and there is no reason why defense counsel would have strategically failed to 
object to the prosecutor’s misconduct, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
Finally, the error is not harmless because “there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial.”  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  The main issue in this case was 
whether Mr. Bagshaw possessed the methamphetamine that the officers later found in the area 
near the front of where the van was parked.  The State’s theory was that Mr. Bagshaw ditched 
the methamphetamine at the front of the van.  To make that theory more believable, the 
prosecutor told the jury that Mr. Bagshaw knew that, based on past run-ins with the law, he 
would be out of the view of the dash camera at the front of the van.  (Tr., p.171, Ls.4–5.)  Absent 
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the prosecutor’s baseless claim, the only evidence of why Mr. Bagshaw went to the front of the 
van was his own testimony—Deputy Humpherys did not specify where to go, and the front was 
nearest to him.  (Tr., p.159, Ls.17–20.)  There is thus a reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
         
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bagshaw respectfully requests that the Court vacate his conviction, reverse the order 
granting the State’s motion for reconsideration, and remand to the district court for a new trial. 
 DATED this 23rd day of February, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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